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Introduction
Carbon embodied in trade, that is emitted during the production of goods that are later exported, has increased dramatically over the last decades (see e.g., IPCC 2014, chapter 5.4). Hence, it is crucial to understand the role of trade in order to design effective international climate policies and avoid distortions in firms' and countries' incentives (Jakob and Marschinski 2013 , Kander et al 2015 , Anouliès 2016 . Building on recent literature on drivers and trends of global (de)carbonization, such as Guan et al's (2014) study of carbon intensity in China or de Melo and Mathys' (2010) survey of the linkages between trade and global climate change, this paper investigates the consequences of trade on global emissions and some drivers of embedded carbon.
After the introduction of the Kyoto Protocol, it was suspected that carbon emissions could "leak", in the sense that production of carbon-intensive goods could be relocated from Annex B countries (those with commitments in the Kyoto Protocol) to nonAnnex B countries, and those goods be then imported back to Annex B countries. If not coordinated, unilateral policies targeting emission reduction could then appear as effective at the country-level but in fact be undermined or even counterproductive at the global level. In response to these concerns, the consumption-based accounting (also called carbon footprint) principle was developed. According to this principle, it should be the final consumer of a good, not the producer, who is held accountable for emissions. Implementing such a principle is challenging since it requires the representatives of final consumers to understand the mechanisms involved and have instruments to influence emissions up in the production chain, even if these emissions occur abroad.
As shown in Figure 1 , carbon emissions embodied in trade constitute a substantial share of global emissions. Over the last 15 years, they have risen from about one quarter of global emissions to approximately one third. This evolution mirrors the growth in the traded portion of global GDP over the same period. The sharp decline after 2008 is likely due to the global economic downturn, but the long-run upward trend is expected to continue. Figure 1 also displays the development of emission-intensities over time, for worldwide consumption and worldwide exports, respectively. We observe that emission intensities remained stable between 1995 and 2003, and then rapidly declined.
Nevertheless, traded goods tend to have substantially higher emission intensities, relative to the average final consumption, implying that the sheltered sectors have lower emission intensities. In this paper, we start by decomposing net CO2 exports into trade deficits, sectoral structure of the exporting country, and average emission intensity of the country. The relative importance of these three components and their relationships is interesting per se.
For instance, if the latter two components are correlated in the sense that emissionintensive countries tend to specialize in dirty sectors, increased trade would, everything else held equal, lead to increased emissions at the worldwide level. We then go one step further and identify determinants of sectoral structure and emission intensities. Based on the literature (Aichele and Felbermayr 2012 , 2015 , Gerlagh et al 2015 , Grether et al 2014 , Michielsen 2013 Steckel et al 2015) , we focus on fossil fuel reserves and climate policies such as the Kyoto Protocol as potential drivers. By identifying these drivers, our study provides insight into the impacts of fossil fuel market developments and future carbon policies on the evolution of emissions at the global level.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the literature. Section 3 describes the data used and the methodology applied to compute embodied carbon emissions. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
1 If a commodity is imported, repackaged and exported, emissions are counted as if traded twice. In this sense, there is double counting and the share of traded emissions is overestimated. 
Literature review
Our analysis builds on and combines several strands of the literature. It is first connected to the literature concerned with decomposing trade's impact on emissions. In an influential paper, Grossman and Krueger (1993) We use the same database, and extend the analysis with an econometric approach allowing to uncover systematic relationships between economic growth and CO2 flows. Aichele and Felbermayr (2012, 2013) 
Empirical methodology
Our empirical methodology derives from a standard input-output analysis (see e.g., Miller
and Blair 2009 for an extensive presentation). In this framework, CO2 emissions in sector of country can be expressed as territorial emissions T (also known as production-based) or consumption-based emissions C as follows: 2
where represents emission intensity of output, i.e., the quantity of CO2 emitted per unit of output, represents total output, represents emission intensity of value added, represents value added, is emission intensity of demand inclusive of embodied carbon emissions, and is final demand. Note that ∑ = ∑ by definition. Note: See Table 4 in the appendix for full sector names. 2 ) can then be expressed as: 3
where is an identity matrix, is the input-output coefficients matrix, i.e., a matrix where each column indicates the inputs from all sectors needed to produce one unit of output in a given sector, are exports from country and are imports to country . We decompose net CO2 exports into economic trade balances, sector specialization, and country-specific emission intensities as follows:
where is the row vector of sectoral emission intensities of demand in country (this is also known as the Leontief multiplier or embodied emissions intensity), � is the row vector of world average emission intensities per sector, � is the average emission intensity over all sectors and all countries (i.e., a scalar), and is a unity vector.
The first term on the right-hand-side of (4) represents the net CO2 trade related to the economic trade balance. This term uses a world-wide average emission intensity of goods. Countries exporting much more than they import, such as China, tend to have a positive first term.
The second term represents the net CO2 trade position related to the sectorstructure of exports and imports. The term is positive if a country exports in sectors that tend to be emission intensive and/or it imports in sectors that tend to have low associated emissions. The second term is closely related to the pollution haven debate.
The third term represents the net CO2 trade related to differences in the emission intensities between the (exporting) country and the countries it imports from. The term is positive if domestic emission intensities exceed the sector world average and/or if the foreign emission intensities from which the country imports are below the sector world average. This term is thus expected to be positive for countries that have a domestically 'inefficient' production, and for countries whose trade partners are emission efficient. That is, this term measures the overall production efficiency of a country relative to its trading partners. A country such as the US may be emission-intensive compared to the EU, but if it trades more intensely with China, then its relative performance to China matters more for its net trade in CO2 position.
We consider the decomposition proposed in (4) In addition, we test alternative measures of emission intensity that are relevant in the context of trade:
The left-hand side variable in (7) measures emission intensity of country exports, relative to emissions for an average country with the same sector structure of exports. The dependent variable in (8) is similar, but specified for each bilateral country-pair:
represents exports from country to country during year . In this case, we control for partner-country-year fixed effects. These two dependent variables are closely related to the third term of (4) and these two equations will give insights in the factors explaining country-specific emission intensities.
We then investigate sectoral structure of trade by estimating the following four equations: All the dependent variables in these equations are measures of sector structure and are linked to the second term in (4). The dependent variable in (9) measures the sector bias of exports towards emission-intensive sectors, i.e., how the export structure of country causes its emission intensity to differ from the average. In (10), we consider an equivalent variable for imports. In (11), the dependent variable measures the sector bias for all country-pairs of bilateral trade, considering each country-pair in both ways ( is both an exporter to and an importer from ). In (12), we construct a symmetric equivalent that combines exports and imports into a single variable containing the net exports. We expect
Instrumenting and weighting observations
In our analysis, we investigate whether an increase in fossil fuel rents (e.g., coal) tends to increase or decrease the emission intensity of production (5), consumption (6), exports (7)- (8), or that it changes the sector structure of trade (9)-(12). However, a correlation could also point to reverse causality: an increased demand for emission-intensive sectors leads to higher fossil fuel prices, and thus to higher fossil fuel rents. Therefore, we instrument the fuel rents. 4 For each country, we calculate the share of that country , over the entire period, in worldwide fuel rents: . In addition, for each year , we calculate the global fuel rents as a share of world GDP: . The interaction between the country share and the world fuel rents is used as an instrument for each country's fossil fuel rent:
By construction there cannot be reverse causality if we assume that country 's influence on total world resource rents is sufficiently small: an increase in fossil fuel demand in one country in one year will have no effect on the interaction term for that country in that year.
We also use trade openness as an independent variable in our estimations.
Similarly, to avoid endogeneity, we instrument openness through the interaction between a country's average openness over the entire period and the world trade share in world GDP, for each year. In contrast to a standard instrumental variable estimation, in which all instruments would enter all first stage equations, we instrument each endogenous variable by its single instrument separately. This methodology allows avoiding cross-influences of the various instruments on the endogenous variables.
We conduct both weighted and unweighted regressions. Weighting is warranted if we expect that larger observations have better quality, in relative terms, compared to observations related to small trade flows. Another way to interpret differences between weighted and unweighted estimations is that the former indicates marginal effects for the weighted average observation, while the latter applies to the unweighted average observation. The two outcomes will differ when large countries behave systematically differently compared to smaller ones. Figure 3 shows the relation between income and emission intensity of value added. It shows that production in high-income countries tends to be more emission-efficient compared to low-income countries. However, for a given income level, there is large variation in the emission intensity of production. Figure 4 displays the evolution of emission intensities for some large countries.
Results

Emission intensities
While emission intensities increase and then decreases over the years for Russia and Brazil, they increased continuously in India and Japan, and decreased continuously in China. The US does not show any significant change in emission intensities. The level of income is clearly negatively correlated with the level of emission intensities across countries ( Figure   3 ), but the evolution over time is less clear (Figure 4) . 
Decomposing CO2 embedded in trade
In Figure 5 , we implement the decomposition of net CO2 exports presented in equation (4) and plot the sector structure (second term) effect against the efficiency effect (third term) for all countries in our sample. Two countries, the US and China, have the largest net CO2 trade positions, as indicated by the size of their marker. But when compared to their total trade, China and Russia stand out as net CO2 exporters because of their emission-intensive production, whereas the size of US CO2 inflows is relatively moderate compared to the size of its domestic emissions. 
Patterns in emission intensity and trade specialization
We next investigate how income, fossil fuel abundance, trade opportunities, and Kyoto affect emission-intensity of production and trade. While Almer and Winkler (2012) find no support for the hypothesis that Kyoto countries reduced domestic emissions, Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) obtain that higher fuel prices and a cleaner energy mix can be observed in countries that signed Kyoto. In addition to the environmental policy variable, we account for fossil fuel rents as a share of GDP and trade openness as independent variables.
Results are displayed in Table 1 . The first row shows that there is a wellestablished substantial negative effect of income on emission intensity. The efficiency improvement, however, does not catch up with income since the elasticity is significantly smaller than one in absolute value. Thus, overall emissions robustly increase with income.
The second-order effect of income is small in size, implying no sign of an environmental Kuznets curve. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/***: significant at 10/5/1%. All regressions are estimated by IV and respectively weighted by VA, output, or exports. Each rent is instrumented by its own instrument. The first stage estimations are displayed in Appendix Table 5 .
We find that coal-abundance substantially increases emission intensity. A one percentage point increase in coal rents, as a share of GDP, increases emission intensity of value added and exports by about 4%. Evidence is weaker for oil, but still significant in most estimations. For natural gas, we find a small negative effect: gas abundant countries tend to become less emission-intensive in years of high gas prices. These results reflect the relative carbon-intensity of fuels, with gas being less carbon intensive than oil and oil being less carbon intensive than coal.
Concerning trade and climate policies, we obtain mixed evidence. The signs of the coefficients are not consistent across all estimations. Also, comparing weighted against unweighted estimates, we obtain sign reversals (compare Table 7 in appendix with Table   1 ). The results suggest that in large countries (weighted estimations) emission intensities increase with trade and Kyoto ratification has not reduced the emission intensity, while for small countries (unweighted estimations), both trade and ratification are correlated to decreasing emission intensities. We also find a sign reversal when substituting Sauter's (2014) CO2 stringency index for the Kyoto index (see Table 9 and Table 10 in appendix).
We have not controlled for endogeneity of the Kyoto Protocol or CO2 index. When comparing OLS and instrumental variable estimations for the Kyoto variable Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) find very similar results.
In Table 2 , we consider the drivers for the sectoral composition of trade. High income countries tend to specialize in emission-intensive sectors, as exports in these sectors increase if we do not control for the trading partners (see equation (9). However, imports in emission-intensive sectors also increase (10), and when controlling for trading partners, high-income countries seem to specialize in emission-extensive sectors (11a, (12). These results are suggestive of the following pattern. High-income countries have comparative advantages in emission-extensive sectors but they also trade more with other high-income partners who demand imports from emission-intensive sectors (11b). The net effect of an income increase is then still an increase in the emission-intensity of trade, for both imports and exports (9, (10) . A similar pattern is also found in unweighted estimations (Table 8 in appendix).
The estimates also provide some (weak) evidence for coal abundance leading to specialization in dirty sectors, and oil and gas abundance leading to specialization in relatively clean sectors. Increased trade leads to an unambiguous increase in the share of emission-intensive sectors. Not only are the traded goods more emission intensive, compared to the average consumption good, but increased trade amplifies the difference.
This result is confirmed in unweighted estimations.
Kyoto ratification is positively correlated with an increase in imports of emissionintensive sectors ((10), both weighted and unweighted), but not when controlling for the trading partner (11b). This result suggests a shift in trading partners, following Kyoto ratification, as a potential consequence of reducing domestic emissions. However, the effect on exports, controlling for trading partners, is not robust for weighted versus unweighted estimates. There might be structural differences between large and small countries. 
Conclusion
Trade must be considered when designing greenhouse gas mitigation policies. Indeed, global emissions are not reduced when countries export their emissions outside of a regulatory zone, and it is not desirable that domestic abatement policies are undermined by carbon-intensive imports. Hence, it is crucial to have good understanding of the trends and drivers of CO2 embodied in trade.
Our findings show that more trade-exposed sectors are more emissions intensive than sheltered sectors, and that increasing trade tends to further increase the emission-intensity of traded goods. One possible mechanism underlying this positive correlation is based on fossil fuels as production factors. We find coal abundance leads both to a specialization in 'dirty' sectors, and to an increase in emissions per output when controlling for sector structure: a fossil-fuel-endowment effect.
These findings highlight the importance of considering trade, and paying due attention to fossil fuel markets, specifically coal, when designing CO2 reduction strategies.
Many of the most carbon-intensive countries are also developing economies. As their income grows, their emission intensity tends to decline, but insufficiently to compensate the direct effect of income on emissions. The net effect of an income rise is thus to increase overall emissions. Though our analysis does not offer immediate solutions to disconnect income growth and increased trade from increased emissions, it offers some insights into the drivers, and as such, is helpful to focus the search for future effective measures.
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Aichele Standard errors in parentheses. */**/***: significant at 10/5/1%. All regressions are unweighted, but the smallest 25% observations are removed. Rents are instrumented. Table 9 and Table 10 provide a robustness test for the results in Table 1 . In Table 9 , we substitute Sauter's (2014) CO2 index for the Kyoto index used in the main text. However, we note that Sauter's index is not available for major economies (US, China, Brazil and Indonesia; see the number of observations). Therefore, we repeat the estimations from Table 1 for the restricted country sample and report them in Table 10 . We find that the change in country sample affects the Kyoto coefficients significantly. This is in line with the findings presented in Table 7 , where major economies also received equal weight as small economies.
Appendix 1. Data Description
We proceed similarly to provide a robustness check for the results in Table 2 . We repeat the estimations from Table 2 in Table 11 using Sauter's index, and in Table 12 for the same restricted sample but with the Kyoto index. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/***: significant at 10/5/1%. All regressions are estimated by IV and respectively weighted by VA, output, or exports. Each rent is instrumented by its own instrument. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/***: significant at 10/5/1%. All regressions are estimated by IV and respectively weighted by VA, output, or exports. Each rent is instrumented by its own instrument. 
